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Ensuring Due Process in Alien Exclusion Proceedings
After Landon v. Plasencia
Congress has exclusive authority to establish immigration laws
and procedures.' This authority is limited, however, by the constitu-
tional rights of resident aliens.2 An alien attempting to enter the
United States for the first time has no constitutional rights and thus
may be excluded 3 on any ground and by any procedure the legislature
deems appropriate.4 Once an alien has been admitted into the United
States,5 however, his or her status under the Constitution changes sig-
nificantly.6 When expelling a permanent resident alien,7 the govern-
1. Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895) ("The power of Con-
gress to exclude aliens altogether from the United States, or to prescribe the terms and con-
ditions upon which they may come to this country, and to have its declared policy in that
regard enforced exclusively through executive officers, without judicial intervention, is set-
tled by our previous adjudications."). See also Kleindiest v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766
(1972); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 216 (1953); United States
ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542-44 (1950) (although only Congress has the
power to pass laws regarding immigration, the executive branch shares the power of exclu-
sion under its foreign affairs powers).
2. A resident alien is a "person" under the fourteenth amendment, Graham v. Rich-
ardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971); Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); under the
fifth and sixth amendments, Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); and under the Civil Rights Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1976), Roberto v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 177 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
920 (1950) (decided under 8 U.S.C. § 41, the predecessor of 42 U.S.C. § 1981). These
amendments to the Constitution use words of general, rather than particular, application;
thus, their provisions safeguard all persons-aliens as well as citizens. See generally B.
SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A TEXTBOOK 361 (2d ed. 1979). Note, also, that a few
cases on the civil rights of aliens assume that an alien resident in this country is protected by
the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) ("Freedom of speech
and of press is accorded aliens residing in this country.") (dictum); Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252 (1941); see also Comment, The Alien and the Constitution, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 547,
564-65 (1953).
3. As used in this Comment, the term "exclusion" means preventing someone from
entering the United States who is physically outside the United States or is treated as being
so. "Expulsion" means forcing someone out of the United States who is physically within
the United States or is treated as being so. "Deportation" means the moving of someone
away from the United States after his or her exclusion or expulsion. Kwong Hai Chew v.
Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 & n.4 (1953).
4. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950). See also
Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
5. This Comment does not address the constitutional rights of aliens who illegally
enter the United States.
6. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950).
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ment must afford the alien many constitutional protections, including
procedural due process.8 Deportation proceedings for resident aliens
have been developed by Congress in conformance with these constitu-
tional protections.9 In contrast, exclusion procedures for aliens at-
tempting initial entry into the United States have had no such
constitutional restraints. 10
A unique situation arises when a permanent resident alien travels
7. As used in this Comment, the term "permanent resident alien" refers to the "status
of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States
as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed."
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1976). Permanent means a "relationship of continuing or lasting
nature, as distinguished from temporary, but a relationship may be permanent even though
it is one that may be dissolved eventually at the instance either of the United States or of the
individual, in accordance with the law." Id. § 1101 (a)(3 1). Residence means "the place of
general abode; the place of general abode of a person means his principal, actual dwelling
place in fact, without regard to intent." Id. § 1101(a)(33) (Supp. V 1981).
8. See supra note 2; see also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J.,
concurring) ("The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission for the
first time to these shores. But once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he
becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our
borders. Such rights include those protected by the First and the Fifth Amendments and by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. None of these provisions acknowl-
edges any distinction between citizens and resident aliens. They extend their inalienable
privileges to all 'persons' and guard against any encroachment on those rights by federal or
state authority.").
9. Note, however, that many of an alien's constitutional protections do not apply to
deportation proceedings. Deportation has been held to be a civil penalty rather than a crim-
inal one. Therefore, a resident alien may be detained without bail. Carlson v. Landon, 342
U.S. 524 (1952). An alien may be deported no matter how long he or she has been a United
States resident, and without being charged with a criminal act. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S.
522 (1954). An alien may also be examined in an administrative hearing without a jury. 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Dicta in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
33, mod#7ed, 339 U.S. 908 (1950), indicated that this might be constitutionally objectionable
if the inquiring officer combines prosecuting and adjudicative functions. See Comment,
Deportation and Exclusion.4 A Continuing Dialogue Between Congress and the Courts, 71
YALE L.J. 760, 769-70 (1962). The Supreme Court has been increasingly sensitive to the
hardship to the alien and his or her family resulting from deportation decrees. In Fong Haw
Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1948), the Court characterized deportation as "a drastic measure
and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile. It is the forfeiture for misconduct of a
resident in this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty." Id. at 10 (citation omitted). Never-
theless, deportation proceedings are still conducted as civil investigations, with criminal pro-
cedural protections denied the alien. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 237 (1960); Nai
Cheng Chen v. INS, 537 F.2d 566, 568 (1st Cir. 1976). See generally Comment, Due Process
and Deportation:. A Critical Examination of the Plenary Power and the Fundamental Fairness
Doctrine, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 397 (1981) (advocating treatment of deportation hear-
ings as criminal proceedings) [hereinafter cited as Hastings Comment].
10. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) ("[Ain alien
who seeks admission to this country may not do so under any claim of right. Admission of
aliens to the United States is a privilege granted by the sovereign United States Govern-
ment. Such privilege is granted to an alien only upon such terms as the United States shall
prescribe.").
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abroad and then attempts to return to the United States. The United
States Supreme Court, in Landon v. Plasencia,"I grappled with this situ-
ation and decided that the returning resident alien retains the constitu-
tional right to due process, but not the right to a deportation hearing.
Thus, under Plascencia the determination of a resident alien's right to
return to the United States must be made in an exclusion hearing that
affords due process. Because exclusion hearings, as outlined in the Im-
migration and Nationality Act,12 do not provide the necessary due pro-
cess protections, the Plasencia decision in effect created an undefined
category of immigation procedure. Without either further decisions by
the Supreme Court or legislation by Congress setting forth specific due
process guidelines, immigration judges will have complete discretion in
determining what process is "due" in an exclusion hearing for a re-
turning resident alien.
This Comment examines the reasoning and effect of the Supreme
Court's decision in Plasencia. The Comment first discusses the consti-
tutional status of resident aliens, nonresident aliens, and returning resi-
dent aliens and the applicable procedures developed by Congress to
proceed against such aliens. It next examines the evolution of the "re-
entry doctrine" and its effect on the substantive rights of aliens. The
Comment then discusses the Plasencia opinion, which authorizes the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)13 to proceed against re-
turning resident aliens in exclusion hearings in which due process is
afforded the alien. The Comment suggests guidelines that immigration
judges should consider in determining what procedure to afford re-
turning resident aliens, but concludes that congressional action is nec-
essary to specify the procedural rights of returning resident aliens in
exclusion proceedings.
The Constitutional Status of Aliens
A resident alien is a "person" under the Constitution' 4 and is
therefore afforded certain rights not granted nonresident aliens,' 5 in-
11. 103 S. Ct. 321 (1982).
12. Also known as the McCarran-Walter Act. Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). The 1952 Immigration and
Nationality Act was "the first attempt [by Congress] to bring within one cohesive and com-
prehensive statute the various laws relating to immigration, naturalization, and nationality."
1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1677-78.
13. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), under the supervision and con-
trol of the Attorney General, was established by Congress to control and guard the bounda-
ries and borders of the United States against the illegal entry of aliens. 8 U.S.C. § 1103
(1976).
14. See supra note 2.
15. The resident alien does not enjoy the security of citizenship, but instead remains
subject to Congress' power to deport. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711-14
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cluding the right to due process. 16 A resident alien threatened with
expulsion must be afforded sufficient notice 17 and the opportunity to
present his or her case effectively. 18 In addition, the Government must
bear the burden of proving that a resident alien should be expelled.' 9
To ensure a fair hearing for resident aliens facing expulsion, the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act 20 incorporates these due process rights into
its deportation procedures.2 1
Under the Act, a deportation action must provide the alien with
fair notice of the time and place of the hearing, and of the nature of the
charges filed against him or her.22 The alien has the right to be repre-
sented by counsel, to present evidence, and to examine and cross-ex-
amine witnesses.2 3 The immigration judge2 4 must determine whether
the alien should be expelled for a reason delineated in the Act, 25 and
(1893). In contrast to the almost unrestricted power to exclude, however, Congress' author-
ity to expel is limited by the constitutional rights of the resident alien. See supra note 2.
16. United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 133-34 (1924) (right to a fair hear-
ing); Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 468 (1912) (hearing may be conclusive when
fairly conducted). See also supra note 8.
17. United States v. Gasca-Kraft, 522 F.2d 149, 152 (9th Cir. 1975); Hirsch v. INS, 308
F.2d 562, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1962).
18. Chim Ming v. Marks, 367 F. Supp. 673, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 505 F.2d 1170
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 911 (1975); United States ex rel. Belfrage v. Kenton,
224 F.2d 803, 805 (2d Cir. 1955).
19. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1966); United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v.
Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153 (1923).
20. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See supra note 12.
21. See infra notes 22-26 & accompanying text. Since the requirement of a fair hearing
is based on the Constitution, the concept of due process of law is always expanding to satisfy
currently prevailing norms of fairness. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50
(1950). Therefore, the statutory guidelines provided in the Immigration and Nationality Act
present only the minimum requirements. But see supra note 9.
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The hearing is generally held near
the resident alien's home, though it may also be brought in the locality in which the act
giving rise to grounds for deportation took place. La Franca v. INS, 413 F.2d 686, 689 n.9
(2d Cir. 1969). See general,y Chlomos v. INS, 516 F.2d 310, 312-14 (3d Cir. 1975).
23. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(2)-(3), 1362 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
24. Immigration judges were originally designated "special inquiry officers" under the
Act. However, "immigration judge" is now considered the appropriate title for these admin-
istrative officials (though the statutory designation of "special inquiry officer" is unchanged).
IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 5.7b (1982).
25. The grounds for deportation can be divided into four broad categories: (1) those
aliens who have entered the United States illegally or violated the conditions of their stay, 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2), (9), (10) (1976); (2) those aliens excludable at entry but nevertheless
permitted to enter the country, id. § 1251(a)(1); (3) those aliens who, within five years of
entry committed an act or assumed a condition that rendered them deportable, id.
§ 125 1(a)(3)-(4), (8), (13); and (4) those aliens who at any time after entry committed certain
crimes or other immoral acts that rendered them deportable, id § 1251 (a)(4)-(6), (11), (12),
(17). See Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56 COLUM. L.
REv. 309, 315 (1956). Examples of the third category include: conviction of a crime involv-
ing moral turpitude with a prison sentence for a term of one year or more, 8 U.S.C.
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must base the decision on "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evi-
dence" presented at the hearing.26
In contrast to a resident alien, a nonresident alien has virtually no
rights under the Constitution.27 Congress has the exclusive power to
establish procedures for admitting and rejecting aliens at the border,28
a power acknowledged by the Supreme Court in United States ex rel
Knauff v. Shaughnessy.29 The Knauff Court held that "[w]hatever the
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien
denied entry is concerned. ' 30 Thus, an alien attempting initial entry is
subject to the statutory guidelines established by Congress and admin-
istered by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 3'
Because there are no constitutional constraints on Congress in es-
tablishing admissibility procedures, any procedural protections pro-
vided by the Immigration and Nationality Act are privileges granted to
the aliens, not rights of the aliens seeking admission.3 2 An immigration
judge conducting an exclusion hearing has broad discretionary power
§ 1251(a)(4) (1976); being institutionalized at public expense because of mental disease ex-
isting prior to entry, id. § 1251(a)(3); becoming a public charge from causes arising before
entry, id. § 125 1(a)(8); and assisting another alien, for personal gain, in an attempt to enter
the United States illegally, id. § 125 1(a)(13). Examples of the fourth category include: con-
viction of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, Id. § 1251(a)(4); willing failure to
comply with the registration requirements of the Alien Registration Act, id. § 1251(a)(5);
joining, or becoming "affiliated with," the Communist Party of the United States or any
other totalitarian party, id. § 1251(a)(6); becoming a drug addict or violating the narcotics
laws, id. § 125 1(a)(I 1); connection with a house of prostitution or importation of aliens for
immoral purposes, id. § 1251(a)(12); conviction for illegal possession of any automatic guns,
id. § 1251(a)(14); and conviction of a violation of the espionage, sabotage, selective service,
or trading-with-the-enemy acts in addition to being found to be an undesirable resident, id.
§ 1251(a)(17) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
26. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981) ("reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence"). The government bears
the burden of proving that the alien falls under one of the categories of deportable aliens.
See supra note 19.
27. See supra notes 4-5.
28. See supra note 1. During the first 100 years of United States history there were no
restrictions on immigration. Since the late 1800's, however, there have been increasing limi-
tations placed on aliens seeking admission. Some of these statutes concerned prostitutes and
convicts, Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477; race, Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126,
22 Stat. 58-59; lunatics, idiots and those likely to become public charges, Act of August 3,
1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214; and political ideology, Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 2, 32
Stat. 1213-14. In 1952, Congress codified various immigration restrictions which had devel-
oped since the late 1800's. These immigrations restrictions are set forth in the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
29. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
30. Id. at 544.
31. See supra note 13.
32. United States ex rel Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. at 542. The Immigration and
Nationality Act provides the basic procedure to be followed by Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service officials in conducting exclusion proceedings. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225-1226 (1976).
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in directing that proceeding. 33 The judge is not restricted to the exclu-
sion grounds suggested by the government and may explore any other
possible ground for exclusion. 34 The alien bears the burden of proving
that he or she does not fall within any of the categories of excludable
aliens outlined in the Act. 35 The alien may appeal the hearing decision
to the Board of Immigration Appeals, 36 but once this Board has acted
on the appeal the only recourse available is through a writ of habeas
corpus. 37 An alien who is determined to be inadmissible is sent back to
his or her country of origin. 38
Although a resident alien enjoys many constitutional protections
not afforded nonresident aliens, he or she may lose this protected status
by traveling abroad. Should the alien's return to the United States be
deemed an "entry" 39 under the Act, he or she may be treated as an
33. The judge may administer oaths, present and receive evidence, interrogate, ex-
amine and cross-examine the alien and witnesses, issue subpoenas and order the taking of
depositions in cases pending before him or her. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
The immigration judge weighs all the evidence and determines the credibility of the wit-
nesses in rendering a decision. See Woon Sun Seung v. Proctor, 99 F.2d 285, 286 (9th Cir.
1938); In re Becerra-Miranda, 12 1. & N. Dec. 358, 367-68 (B.I.A. 1967). The judicial rules
of evidence are inapplicable in administrative hearings to determine admissibility of aliens.
Jung Yen Loy v. Cahil, 81 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1936); United States ex rel. Smith v.
Curran, 12 F.2d 636, 637-38 (2d Cir. 1926).
34. 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(a)-(b) (1982). See also In re Salazar, 17 I. & N. Dec. 167, 169
(B.I.A. 1979).
35. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1361 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The categories of excludable aliens
under § 1182 may be divided into three types: exclusions relating to formalities in the appli-
cation for entry process, exclusions relating to personal qualifications, and exclusions relat-
ing to misconduct. The first category includes aliens previously excluded, deported or
removed, id. § 1182(a)(16)-(17); aliens without documents or with improper documents, id.
§ 1182(20)-(21) (1976); see United States ex rel. Santarelli v. Hughes, 116 F.2d 613, 615 (3d
Cir. 1940); and aliens who have made willful misrepresentations in seeking entry, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(19) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The second category includes those aliens with physi-
cal and mental defects, id. § 1182(a)(l)-(7); illiterates and aliens likely to become public
charges, id. § 1182(a)(15), (25); aliens who accompany excluded aliens into the country, id.
§ 1182(a)(30); and aliens coming to perform labor where there is no need for additional,
non-citizen laborers, id. § 1182(a)(14) (Supp. V 1981). The third category includes crim-
inals, id. § 182(a)(9) (1976); immoral aliens, id. § 1 182(a)(1 1)-(12); narcotics violators, id.
§ 1 182(a)(23); smugglers of aliens, id. § 1 182(a)(3 1); subversives, id. § 1 182(a)(27) - (29); and
draft evaders, id. § 1182(a)(22). In Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1975), the court
observed that "[tlhis portion of the Act is like a magic mirror, reflecting the fears and con-
cerns of past Congresses." Id. at 189.
36. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b) (1976); 8 C.F.R. § 236.5(a)-(b) (1982).
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) (1976); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660
(1892). Cf. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 263-65 (1954) (alien
deemed deportable in deportation hearing may appeal directly to federal district court).
38. Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 651 (2d Cir. 1969). The country of last domicile is
the country from which an alien came. United States ex ref. Milanovic v. Murff, 253 F.2d
941, 943 (2d Cir. 1958); United States ex rel. Boraca v. Schlotfeldt, 109 F.2d 106, 109 (7th
Cir. 1940).
39. "The term 'entry' means any coming of an alien into the United States, from a
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alien attempting to enter for the first time and may be excluded on one
of many grounds in an exclusion hearing. 40 If, however, a resident
alien's return is not an "entry," then the alien is treated as though he or
she had never left the country, and is entitled to all of the procedural
protections afforded resident aliens physically present in the United
States.4'
The concept of "entry" is a legal fiction which has developed
through statutory and case law.42 It is possible under this concept for
an alien to leave the country and return without making an "entry."
Whether an "entry" has been made is a critical question in determining
the constitutional rights of a returning resident alien. Therefore, it is
important to understand the history and application of "entry" and the
"re-entry doctrine."
Entry, the Re-Entry Doctrine, and the Resident Alien
Historically, all aliens, including resident aliens, were considered
to have made an "entry" upon coming into the United States from
abroad.43 "Entry" is a legal term of art defined as "any coming of an
alien into the United States from a foreign port or place." 44 In 1933,
the Supreme Court in United States ex rel Vo/pe v. Smith45 held that
even the return of an alien from a foreign country is an entry.46 The
foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether voluntarily or otherwise, ex-
cept that an alien having a lawful permanent residence in the United States shall not be
regarded as making an entry into the United States for the purposes of the immigration laws
if the alien proves to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that his departure to a foreign
port or place or to an outlying possession was not intended or reasonably to be expected by
him or his presence in a foreign port or place or in an outlying possession was not voluntary:
Provided, That no person whose departure from the United States was occasioned by depor-
tation proceedings, extradition, or other legal process shall be held to be entitled to such
exception." 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(13) (1976) (emphasis in original).
40. Del Castillo v. Carr, 100 F.2d 338, 341 (1938). See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981) (grounds for exclusion).
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (deportation procedure); id. § 1251(a)
(grounds for deportation). See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963); see also
infra notes 57-63 & accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 43-65 & accompanying text.
43. United States ex rel. Polymeris v. Trudell, 284 U.S. 279, 280 (1932); Lewis v. Frick,
233 U.S. 291, 297 (1914); Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 91 (1914).
44. 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(13) (1976).
45. 289 U.S. 422 (1933).
46. Id. at 425. The court upheld the deportation of an alien who, after 24 years of
residence in the United States, was found to be excludable on his return from "a brief visit to
Cuba." The court stated that the word "entry" includes "any coming of an alien from a
foreign country into the United States whether such coming be the first or any subsequent
one." Id.
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strict construction of this "re-entry doctrine, ' 47 however, was softened
in the late 1940's. In Di Pasquale v. Karnuth ,48 the Second Circuit held
that an alien does not make an entry upon returning to the United
States from a foreign country if he or she had no intent to leave the
United States in the first place. 49 The court admitted that Di Pasquale,
a convicted robber, was a "most undesirable member" of the commu-
nity,50 but refused to allow deportation based on the alien's "entry"
after having taken an overnight sleeper from Buffalo to Detroit on a
route passing through Canada.5 1 In Delgadillo v. Carmichael5 2 an
alien, whose ship was torpedoed and sunk, was rescued and taken to
Cuba for a week. 3 The Supreme Court refused to deem his return to
the United States an "entry." The Court distinguished Volpe, stating
that that case involved an alien who "plainly expected or planned to
enter a foreign port or place," whereas this alien "had no part in select-
ing the foreign port as his destination. 54
The holdings in both Di Pasquale and Delgadillo were incorpo-
rated into the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act.5 5 Two excep-
tions were added to the general definition of "entry" which reflect the
situations found in those cases. Thus, under section 101(a)(13) of the
Act, a resident alien does not "enter" the country if his or her departure
from the United States "was not intended or reasonably to be expected
by him [or her]," or if it "was not voluntary. '"56
In 1963, the Supreme Court greatly liberalized its approach to the
entry question. Interpreting section 101 of the Act, the Court in Rosen-
berg v. Fleuti57 decided that it would be inconsistent with the general
ameliorative purpose of Congress to hold that an "innocent, casual and
brief" excursion by a resident alien outside this country's borders was
"intended" as a departure disruptive of his or her resident status.5 8
Thus, a brief excursion abroad should not subject a resident to the con-
sequences of an "entry" into the country upon his or her return.
The Fleuti case involved a Swiss national who was admitted to the
United States as a permanent resident in 1952. He lived in the United
States continuously except for a "couple of hours" in 1956 when he
47. The Supreme Court in Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), used "re-entry
doctrine" to refer to the definition of "entry" as used in Volpe. Id. at 453-54.
48. 158 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947).
49. Id. at 879.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 332 U.S. 388 (1947).
53. Id. at 389.
54. Id. at 390.
55. 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(13) (1976).
56. Id.
57. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
58. Id. at 461-62.
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made a brief visit to Mexico. Fleuti was subsequently ordered de-
ported because he was determined to be excludable at the time of his
re-entry.59
In addressing the issue of whether Fleuti's return to the United
States from an afternoon trip to Mexico constituted an "entry" within
the meaning of section 101(a)(13), the court examined the history of the
re-entry doctrine. It concluded that Congress, in approving the judicial
undermining of Volpe and the relief brought about by the Di Pasquale
and Delgadillo decisions, "could not have meant to limit the meaning
of the exception it created in 101(a)(13) to the facts of those cases." 60
The Court went on to state that Congress did not intend to exclude a
resident alien who "merely stepped across an international border and
returned in 'about a couple of hours.' "61
The lReuti Court held that an "entry" under section 101(a)(13)
must entail an intent to depart "in a manner which can be regarded as
meaningfully interruptive of the alien's permanent residence. '62 The
Court listed several factors which would indicate an intent to meaning-
fully interrupt a resident alien's status: the length of the absence,
whether travel documents were necessary for the departure, the pur-
pose of the trip, and "other possible relevant factors to be developed by
the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. ' 63 Thus, in
contrast to the summary approach of the 1950's, immigration judges
59. Deportation was ordered on the ground that he had been excludable at the time of
his return as an alien "afflicted with psychopathic personality," 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1976),
by reason of the fact that he was a homosexual. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 450-51.
60. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 458. The Court's "brief consideration" of the poli-
cies underlying § 101(a)(1 3) noted that bothDiPasquale and Delgadillo recognized the "mo-
mentous" interests at stake for the resident alien, noting that "[d]eportation can be the
equivalent of banishment or exile." Id. at 459.
61. Id. at 461. The Court analogized Congress' treatment of "continuous residence"
for purposes of naturalization. Under § 101(a)(13) an alien seeking naturalization does not
begin to endanger the five years of "continuous residence" in the United States that must
precede his application for citizenship until he remains outside the country for six months.
The Court stated that this "enlightened concept" reflects a "congressional judgment...
that the exceptions to Section 101(a)(13) should be read to protect resident aliens who are
only briefly absent from the country." Id. at 459-60.
62. Id. at 462.
63. Id. Since the F/eud decision, the courts have attempted to apply the factors
presented there. The courts have followed Fleud's liberalizing trend but have stepped far
away from the factors listed by the F/eud Court. The new factors developed by this "process
of judicial inclusion and exclusion" include the uprooting of family ties, Lozano-Giron v.
INS, 506 F.2d 1073, 1079 (7th Cir. 1974); property or employment interests, id. at 1077-79;
the fact that the alien has minor children who are legal residents or citizens of the United
States, Zimmerman v. Lehmann, 339 F.2d 943, 948-49 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925
(1965); whether the alien is legally present in the United States and whether he relied upon
deceptive methods to secure re-entry, Heitland v. INS, 551 F.2d 495, 502-03 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); if the alien's purpose in leaving the country was to accomplish
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today must determine resident status by weighing several subjective
factors.
While the Fleuti case greatly liberalized the substantive law con-
cerning returning resident aliens, it did not address the questions of
whether resident status may be determined by an immigration judge in
an exclusion hearing and whether due process must be afforded the
returning resident alien. Since the action against Fleuti was brought in
a deportation hearing where due process was afforded the resident
alien, 64 the question of the proper forum in which to determine the
entry question was not at issue. Nor did the cases following Fleuti ad-
dress this procedural issue. Until recently, the authority of immigra-
tion judges to decide the entry question in both exclusion and
deportation hearings was not questioned. 65
Landon v. Plasencia
In 1982, the issue of whether the entry question may be decided in
an exclusion hearing was finally raised. In Landon v. Plasencia,66 the
Supreme Court held that a permanent resident alien was entitled to due
process, but not a deportation hearing, after returning from a trip
abroad.67 Maria Antonieta Plasencia 68 was arrested on June 29, 1975,
while attempting to smuggle six nonresident aliens into the United
some objective which is itself contrary to immigration policy, Longoria-Castenada v. INS,
548 F.2d 233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 853 (1977).
The courts have continued to apply the Fleud factors, including purpose, Martin-Men-
doza v. INS, 499 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113 (1975) (intent to smug-
gle aliens illegally across the border was a meaningful interruption of residence); Palatian v.
INS, 502 F.2d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 1974) (drug smuggling was a "purpose contrary to immi-
gration laws" and therefore meaningful interruption even though illegal intent was formed
after departure from the United States); Vargus-Banuelos v. INS, 466 F.2d 1371, 1374 (5th
Cir. 1972) (no entry when illegal purpose was formed after leaving the United States); and
length of absence, Munoz-Casarez v. INS, 511 F.2d 947, 948 (9th Cir. 1975) (one month
abroad was a meaningful interruption when combined with the fact that the trip was 1000
miles in distance and that the alien had planned it for five years); Kamheangpatiyooth v.
INS, 597 F.2d 1253, 1256 (9th Cir. 1979) (one-month trip abroad was not meaningfully
interruptive of an alien's residency for the purpose of determining continuing presence for
suspension of deportation); In re Salazar, 17 I. & N. Dec. 167, 168 (B.I.A. 1979) (five months
abroad was a meaningful interruption). The courts have differed in their application of
these factors, however.
64. See supra notes 57-59 & accompanying text.
65. In Palatian v. INS, 502 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1974), and Maldonado-Sandoval v. INS,
518 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1975), the Ninth Circuit acquiesced to the power of a judge in an
exclusion hearing to apply the Fleuti factors. InIn re Rico, 16 1. & N. Dec. 181, 186 (B.I.A.
1977), and In re Salazar, 17 I. & N. Dec. 167, 168 (B.I.A. 1979), the immigration judge
assumed the jurisdiction to decide the re-entry question.
66. 103 S. Ct. 321 (1982).
67. Id. at 328-30.
68. Plasencia, a citizen of El Salvador, was admitted as a permanent resident alien in
1970. Id. at 324.
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States. An exclusion hearing conducted the following day resulted in
Plasencia's exclusion and deportation from the United States. The im-
migration judge determined that her two-day trip-to Mexico was a
"meaningful departure" from the United States and that her return was
an entry. This determination led to Plasencia's exclusion under section
212(a)(31) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,69 and was sup-
ported by the finding of "clear and convincing" evidence that she
knowingly aided nonresidents in their attempt to enter the United
States illegally.70
In a habeas corpus action, the United States District Court vacated
the decision of the immigration judge and held that the Immigration
and Naturalization Service could proceed against a returning resident
alien only in a deportation proceeding. 71 The Ninth Circuit agreed
with the district court,72 citing Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding73 and Mal-
donado-Sandoval v. INS 74 as authority. In Chew, the Supreme Court
held that an alien "could not be excluded without the procedural due
process to which he would have been entitled had he never left the
coUntry. ' 75 In Maldonado-Sandoval, the Ninth Circuit had stated that
a "permanent resident alien does not lose the procedural protection to
which he is otherwise entitled simply by making a brief journey
abroad. '76 Based on these two cases the Ninth Circuit concluded that a
69. Section 212(a)(31) states: "[T]he following classes of aliens ... shall be excluded
from admission into the United States: ... Any alien who at any time shall have, know-
ingly and for gain, encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter
or to try to enter the United States in violation of law." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(31) (1976).
70. Plasencia v. Sureck, 637 F.2d 1286, 1287 (9th Cir. 1980). The immigration judge
found that she had "meaningfully interrupted" her residency, assuming that this decision
was appropriate in an exclusion hearing. Id.
71. Id. The report and recommendation of the magistrate as adopted by the district
court are not reported.
72. Id. at 1288-89.
73. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
74. 518 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1975).
75. Kwong Ha Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. at 596. Chew, a resident alien, was tempo-
rarily detained without notice of any charges against him when he returned from a voyage
abroad as a seaman on an American vessel. He was then permanently excluded without the
opportunity to be heard in opposition to the charges against him. Id. at 595.
The Court held that the detention and denial of hearing violated Chew's due process
rights under the Constitution. The opinion stated that Chew's constitutional status prior to
the voyage as a resident alien was not terminated by the voyage. Therefore, the Supreme
Court held that Chew was entitled to a fair hearing upon his return. Id. at 600. But see infra
notes 90-93 & accompanying text.
76. Madonado-Sandoval v. INS, 518 F.2d at 281. On returning from a two or three
day trip to Mexico, petitioner, a resident alien, was refused admission. In the exclusion
hearing, it was determined that he was excludable under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(20) as an immi-
grant who was not in possession of a valid immigrant visa or other re-entry document. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that the differences between exclusion and deportation pro-
ceedings are significant and that the alien's cause might have been successful had he been
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permanent resident alien is entitled to a deportation proceeding to de-
termine if a meaningful interruption in his or her resident status has
occurred.77
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision and held
that the Immigration and Nationality Act permits the INS to proceed
against a returning resident alien in exclusion proceedings. 78 The deci-
sion was based on the Court's interpretation of section 235 of the Act
and on its analyses of Rosenberg v. Fleuti 79 and Kwong Hal Chew v.
Colding.80 The Court agreed with the lower courts that Plasencia was
entitled to due process as a returning resident alien, but refused to
equate this right with the right to a deportation proceeding. 8' The
Court instead remanded the case for a determination of whether
Plasencia had been afforded due process at the exclusion hearing.8 2
In its decision, the Supreme Court first addressed the distinction
made in the Act between exclusion and deportation procedures. The
Court noted that a deportation hearing is the usual means of proceed-
ing against an alien who is already physically present in the United
States, while an exclusion hearing is the usual means of proceeding
against an alien outside the United States seeking admission. While
recognizing that deportation proceedings afford the resident alien more
procedural protections than do exclusion proceedings, the Court never-
theless concluded that the history and the language of the Act reflect a
congressional intent to determine an alien's right to entry in an exclu-
sion hearing.8 3
In its determination of congressional intent, the Court focused on
section 235 of the Act,84 which permits the INS to examine all aliens
given the benefits of a deportation hearing. Citing Rosenberg v. Fleuti, the court held that
the alien had not made an entry and that he was therefore entitled to a deportation proceed-
ing. Id. at 279-81.
77. Judge Wallace dissented, stating that "[tlhe law simply does not provide for the full
panoply of procedural rights which the majority concludes are required." Plasencia v.
Sureck, 637 F.2d at 1289 (Wallace, J., dissenting.)
78. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. at 328.
79. 374 U.S. 449 (1963). See supra notes 57-63 & accompanying text.
80. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
81. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. at 328.
82. Id. at 332.
83. Id. at 329.
84. Section 235 provides in part: "The inspection ... of aliens (including alien crew-
men) seeking admission or readmission to . . .the United States shall be conducted by
immigration officers, except as otherwise provided in regard to special inquiry officers ...
The Attorney General and any immigration officer, including special inquiry officers, shall
have power to administer oaths and to take and consider evidence of or from any person
touching the privilege of any alien or person he believes or suspects to be an alien to enter,
re-enter, pass through, or reside in the United States or concerning any matter which is
material and relevant to the enforcement of this chapter and the administration of the Serv-
ice.. . . Every alien ... who may not appear to the examining immigration officer at the
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seeking to enter, re-enter, pass through, or reside in the United States.85
In addition to the language of section 235, the Court quoted the reports
of the House of Representatives and Senate Committees working on
the establishment of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act. These
reports state that the exclusion procedure is the "sole and exclusive pro-
cedure for determining the admissibility of a person to the United
States."' 86 Based on that language, the Court concluded that the legisla-
tive intent of the Act was to provide an exclusion hearing to all aliens
attempting to enter or return to the United States, including resident
aliens. 87
The Plasencia Court noted that it would not violate the scope or
spirit of Rosenberg v. Fleuti to permit the INS to litigate questions of
entry in exclusion proceedings. 88 Though Fleuti greatly liberalized the
substantive law of entry, the Plasencia Court did not find that this ex-
pansion mandated a deportation hearing. 89
The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding upon which the Fleuti decision was par-
tially based.90 The Ninth Circuit had cited Chew to support its holding
that a resident alien returning from a trip abroad was entitled to a de-
portation hearing. The Supreme Court, in contrast, interpreted Chew
as requiring only that a returning resident alien be afforded due pro-
cess.91 The Court stated that the reasoning in Chew "does not create a
right to identical treatment" for returning resident aliens and resident
aliens physically present within the United States.92 Thus, the
Supreme Court concluded that its decision was in conformity with both
Chew and IReuti 93 and held, based on its interpretation of these cases
port of arrival to be clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to land shall be detained for further
inquiry to be conducted by a special inquiry officer." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)-(b) (1976).
85. The Court placed special emphasis on the words "all," "readmission," and "re-
enter." Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. at 326.
86. Id.
87. Id. The Court concluded that "[niothing in the statutory language or legislative
history suggests that the respondent's status as a permanent resident entitles her to a suspen-
sion of the exclusion hearing or requires the INS to proceed only through a deportation
hearing." Id. at 326-27.
88. Id. at 328.
89. Id. at 328-29.
90. Id. at 328.
91. The Court noted that the question of whether Chew was making an entry was ex-
pressly reserved in Kwong Hal Chew v. Colding, which stated: "We do not regard the consti-
tutional status which petitioner [Chew] indisputably enjoyed prior to his voyage as
terminated by that voyage. From a constitutional point of view, he is entitled to due process
without regard to whether or not, for immigration purposes, he is to be treated as an entrant
alien, and we do not now reach the question of whether he is to be so treated." 344 U.S. 590,
600 (1953). See Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. at 328 n.7.
92. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. at 328.
93. Id. at 328-29. The Supreme Court rejected the application of Shaughnessy v.
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and its determination of congressional intent, that the "entry" issue
may be decided in an exclusion hearing where due process is afforded
the resident alien.94
Exclusion With Due Process
By authorizing the INS to proceed against returning resident
aliens in exclusion hearings, while at the same time requiring that these
exclusion proceedings afford returning aliens due process, the Supreme
Court authorized an immigration procedure that is not defined in the
Immigration and Nationality Act. When the Act was adopted in 1952,
all aliens who left the country (with two minor exceptions) lost their
resident status.95 Thus, when attempting to re-enter the United States,
they had the same status as those attempting to enter for the first time.
The Immigration and Nationality Act was therefore designed to handle
only two classes of aliens: those outside the United States and those
inside the United States. The Act accomplished this through a two-
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), to the Plasencia situation. The Mezei
Court held that a resident alien returning from a nineteen-month trip abroad was lawfully
excluded without a hearing where the exclusion order was based on "information of a confi-
dential nature, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest." Id. at
208. Mezei, who had resided in the United States for 25 years, was deemed to be an entering
alien upon his return from a visit with his dying mother in Romania. The Court held that
"[flor purpose of the immigration laws ... the legal incidents of an alien's entry remain
unaltered whether he has been here once before or not." Id. at 213.
The Mezei Court, in distinguishing Chew stated that "[u]nlike Chew who with full se-
curity clearance and documentation pursued his vocation for four months aboard an Ameri-
can ship," Id. at 214, Mezei "simply left the United States and remained behind the Iron
Curtain for 19 months." Id. The court pointed out that naturalization laws consider mari-
time service such as Chew's to be continuous residence. However, a protracted absence such
as Mezei's is a clear break in an alien's continuous residence in the United States. Thus, the
Mezei Court recognized a clear difference between the Chew case and the facts of its own
case. This distinction was noted by the Plasencia court, which stated: "We need not now
decide the scope of Mezei; it does not govern this case, for Plasencia was absent from the
country only a few days, and the United States has conceded that she has a right to due
process .... " Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. at 330 (citation omitted).
94. Justice Marshall concurred with the majority decision that the Immigration and
Nationality Act permits the INS to proceed against a returning resident alien in an exclusion
proceeding. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. at 332. He dissented, however, from the deci-
sion to remand. He argued that Plasencia was denied due process because she was not given
adequate and timely notice of the charges against her and of her right to retain counsel and
to present a defense. Justice Marshall noted that Plasencia was given less than 24 hours
notice which, he stated, "was not sufficient to afford her a reasonable opportunity to demon-
strate that she was not excludable." Id. at 333. The charges against Plasencia were inade-
quately explained at the hearing itself, in Justice Marshall's opinion. This resulted in the
"virtual assur[ance] that the Government attorney would present his case without factual
and or legal opposition." Id. Justice Marshall therefore stated that Plasencia was denied
due process. Id. at 334.
95. See supra notes 43-54 & accompanying text.
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part structure.96 Exclusion was established to keep persons deemed un-
desirable out of the country97 and deportation was developed to deal
with aliens who had already been granted resident status.98
With the 1963 F7euti decision, however, a liberalizing trend in the
re-entry doctrine began.99 Immigration judges were required to deter-
mine whether a resident alien's return to the United States constituted
an entry.°° During the past two decades this liberalization has contin-
ued, culminating in the Plasencia decision, which requires that due
process be afforded the returning resident alien.101
Congress could not have anticipated in 1952 that the substantive
law regarding returning resident aliens would so dramatically change.
In 1952, there was no reason to include in the Act procedures to afford
returning resident aliens the constitutional protections now required.
Therefore, to incorporate due process into exclusion proceedings in
conformance with the Plasencia decision additional procedures are
necessary.
The Supreme Court in Plasencia had the opportunity to specify
the requirements for exclusion proceedings. In other cases where it de-
cided that procedural due process should be afforded in an administra-
tive hearing, the Court did outline the minimum procedures required
by the Constitution. 0 2 In the area of immigration law, however, the
Court has been hesitant to overstep its authority. Immigration law and
96. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958). These procedures were sepa-
rated in the Act by developing exclusion procedure requirements in part IV of Subchapter
I, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1976), and limiting the standards for deportation to part V, id. § 1251
(1976 & Supp. V 1981). The Act also provides for situations where the two procedures
might conflict. For example, any alien may be deported if at the time of entry he or she fell
within one or more of the classes of aliens excludable by the law existing at the time of such
entry. Id. § 1251(a)(1) (1976).
97. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1361 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See also supra note 35.
98. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
99. See supra notes 57-63 & accompanying text.
100. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963).
101. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321 (1982).
102. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1971), the Court listed the following mini-
mum due process requirements in a parole revocation hearing: "(a) written notice of the
claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him;
(c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence;
(d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral and detached"
hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial
officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factflnders as to the evidence relied on
and reasons for revoking parole. We emphasize there is no thought to equate this second
state of parole revocation to a criminal prosecution in any sense. It is a narrow inquiry; the
process should be flexible enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other
material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial." Id. at 489. In In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966), the Court discussed the minimum process requirements of notice
of charges, right to counsel, confrontation, self-incrimination, and cross-examination, appel-
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procedure has historically been an area of exclusive congressional juris-
diction. 103 Therefore, the Plasencia Court did not list the minimum
due process requirements. Instead, the Court noted that "the role of
the judiciary [in the immigration field] . . . does not extend to impos-
ing procedures that merely displace congressional choices of policy."'04
Though the Plasencia Court did not specify the minimum consti-
tutional requirements for a returning resident alien's exclusion hear-
ing,10 5 it did provide some guidelines. The Court noted that in
evaluating the procedures provided in exclusion hearings, courts must
consider "the interest at stake for the individual, the risk of an errone-
ous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used as well as
the probable value of additional or different procedural safeguards,
and the interest of the government in using the current procedures
rather than additional or different procedures."' 10 6 Thus, the Plasencia
decision requires lower courts and, by implication, immigration judges
to apply a balancing test to determine whether specific due process re-
quirements are adequate.10 7
The Supreme Court recognized that a returning resident alien's
interest is a "weighty one," with the alien "stand[ing] to lose the right
'to stay and live and work in this land of freedom.' "108 The alien may
late review and transcript of proceedings. Id. at 31-59. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254. 264, 266-271 (1969).
103. The right to restrict immigration is based on a "fundamental sovereign attribute."
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953). This power, though
not explicitly granted by the Constitution, has been consistently upheld by the Supreme
Court. Congress has unqualified, plenary power to determine which classes of aliens may be
permitted to enter the United States. See supra note 1. In the Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. 581 (1889), Justice Field stated that the sovereign authority to exclude was restricted
"only by the Constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice which con-
trol, more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations." Id. at 604. In Galvan v. Press, 347
U.S. 522 (1954), Justice Frankfurter wrote that "[plolicies pertaining to the entry of aliens
and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of govern-
ment. In the enforcement of these policies, the Executive Branch of the Government must
respect the procedural safeguards of due process. [citation]. But that the formulation of
these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly imbedded in
the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government." Id.
at 531.
104. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. at 330.
105. The Court held that Plasencia could "invoke the Due Process Clause on returning
to this country," but refused to "decide the contours of the process that is due." Id. at 329.
106. Id. at 320 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)). See also
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)
("[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of cir-
cumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government func-
tion involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental
action.").
107. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. at 330.
108. Id. (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945)).
[Vol. 34
lose the right to rejoin his or her immediate family, "a right that ranks
high among the interests of the individual."10 9 The Court also ac-
knowledged that the government's interest in the efficient administra-
tion of the immigration laws at the border is "weighty."110 The
Plasencia Court, however, did not balance these competing interests.ll'
Instead, it left this task to the lower courts to "evaluate the particular
circumstances and determine what procedures . .. satisfy the mini-
mum requirements of due process on the re-entry of a permanent resi-
dent alien.""12
While new procedures are best instituted through legislative or ju-
dicial action, such actions take time. During the interim, immigration
judges must use their own judgment in determining what procedures
are necessary to afford due process. To aid in the formulation of these
procedures, this Comment suggests possible approaches to providing
due process in an exclusion hearing based on due process decisions in
other areas.
Notice
Returning resident aliens should be afforded timely and adequate
notice of the charges against them."13 Though due process depends on
the particular circumstances, "there can be no doubt that at a minimum
[the Due Process Clause] require[s] that deprivation of life, liberty or
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 330-32. The Supreme Court did balance similar competing interests in
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-66 (1969). In Goldberg, the Court acknowledged the
governmental interest in conserving fiscal and administrative resources, but held that these
interests were not overriding in the welfare context. Though the requirement of a prior
hearing involves greater expense, the Court stated that "the State is not without weapons to
minimize these increased costs. Much of the drain on fiscal and administrative resources
can be reduced by developing procedures for prompt pre-termination hearings and by skill-
ful use of personnel and facilities." Id. at 266.
In contrast, the welfare recipients' interest was great. The Court noted that "to cut off a
welfare recipient in the face of. . . 'brutal need' without a prior hearing of some sort is
unconscionable, unless overwhelming considerations justify it." Id. at 261 (quoting Kelly v.
Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899-900 (1968)). "Against the justified desire to protect public
funds must be weighed the individual's overpowering need in this unique situation not to be
wrongfully deprived of assistance." Id.
After balancing the competing interests the Court concluded that "[t]he stakes are sim-
ply too high for the welfare recipient, and the possibility for honest error or irritable mis-
judgment too great, to allow termination of aid without giving the recipient a chance, if he
so desires, to be fully informed of the case against him so that he may contest its basis and
produce evidence in rebuttal." Id. at 266 (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 904-05
(1968)).
112. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. at 330.
113. Goos v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579-80 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80
(1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970); Exparte Woo Wah Ning, 67 F. Supp.
56, 58 (W.D. Wash. 1946). See generally Cheung v. INS, 418 F.2d 460,462 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case."' 14 Under the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act there is no requirement of notice in an exclu-
sion hearing. 1" 5 Therefore, to provide this important constitutional
protection, immigration judges must look elsewhere to determine what
procedure is "due".
Time of Notice
The Supreme Court's decisions in In re Gault1 6 and Goldberg v.
Kelly" 7 and Justice Marshall's dissent in Landon v. Plasencia" 1 8 may
aid in determining how much notice to provide returning resident
aliens. In In re Gault, the Court held that notice of the hearing should
be given at the earliest practicable time in advance of the hearing." 19
The Court rejected notice given on the day of the hearing as a violation
of due process.120 Justice Marshall also rejected same-day notice in his
dissent in Plasencia, 121 stating that it was insufficient "to afford
[Plasencial a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that she was not
excludable."'' 22 In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court evaluated the seven-
114. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1949).
115. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1976). Some exclusion hearings give less than 24 hours notice. In
In re Loulos, 16 I. & N. Dec. 34 (B.I.A. 1976), notice of the exclusion hearing was delivered
to the alien on August 24, 1976, for a hearing scheduled that day. In Plasencia, the returning
resident alien was arrested at 9:27 on the evening of June 29, 1975. In a notice dated June
30, 1975 her hearing was set for 11:00 a.m. on June 30, 1975. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct.
at 324.
116. 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
117. 397 U.S. 254 (1969).
118. 103 S. Ct. at 332 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 33. Gerald Gault, a 15-year old boy, was taken into cus-
tody as a result of a complaint that he had made lewd telephone calls. At the time Gerald
was picked up, his mother and father were both at work. No notice was left at the Gault
home that Gerald was being taken into custody; his parents learned from a neighbor that he
had been taken to the Detention Home. Id. at 4-5. A petition was filed with the court the
following day, the day of the hearing. It made no reference to any factual basis for the
action which it initiated. It recited only that "said minor is under the age of eighteen years,
and is in need of the protection of this Honorable Court; [and that] said minor is a delin-
quent minor." It prayed for a hearing and an order regarding "the care and custody of said
minor." Id. at 5. No notice was served on the Gaults, and no complainant appeared at the
hearing. No one was sworn in and no transcript or recording was taken. Several days after
the first hearing, a second hearing was held. Again, the complainant was not present, nor
did the judge speak to the complainant or communicate with her at any time. In fact, the
probation officer had only spoken to her once over the telephone. Id. at 7-8. At the end of
the hearing, Gerald was committed, as a juvenile delinquent, to the State Industrial School
"for the period of his minority [that is, until 21], unless sooner discharged by due process of
law." Because no appeal is permitted under Arizona law in juvenile cases, the Gaults peti-
tioned the Supreme Court in habeus corpus. Id.
120. Id. at 33.
121. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. at 332-33.
122. Id. at 333.
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day notice given to welfare recipients of a hearing for revocation of
their welfare benefits.'2 The Court did not deem the seven-day notice
constitutionally insufficient per se, but did note that there could be
cases where "fairness would require that a longer time be given."' 24
These opinions are not controlling in exclusion hearings, yet they
do provide some helpful guidelines. They emphasize the importance
the Supreme Court has placed on timely notice in an administrative
setting. Because adequate notice is such a crucial element of due pro-
cess in these other areas, it is likely to be held essential in a returning
resident alien's exclusion hearing. Therefore, it is suggested that notice
to the resident alien be provided far enough in advance of the hearing
to allow the alien to effectively prepare a defense. This certainly re-
quires more than twenty-four hours notice and may require as much as
one week or more.
Notice of Charges
Notice given to returning resident aliens should not only inform
the alien of the time of the hearing, but should also state all of the
charges which the government will bring.125 In In re Gault, the
Supreme Court stated that notice, to comply with due process require-
ments, must set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity. 126 In
Morrissey v. Brewer,127 the Court stated that notice should include a
statement as to the purpose of the hearing and concluded that, at a
minimum, due process requires written notice of the claimed viola-
tion. 28 Though these cases involved different factual situations, they
did discuss minimum notice requirements in situations where impor-
tant private interests were at stake. 129 A returning resident alien in an
exclusion hearing stands to lose the ability to return to his or her home
123. 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1969). See generaly supra note 111.
124. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 268.
125. See Goos v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579-80 (1975); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
267-68 (1970); Exparte Woo Wah Ning, 67 F. Supp. 56, 58 (W.D. Wash. 1946).
126. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 33.
127. 408 U.S. 471 (1971). InMorrissey, the Supreme Court held that in order to revoke
parole, a reasonably prompt informal inquiry must be conducted by an impartial hearing
officer, with due process afforded the parolee. The Court noted that "the liberty of the pa-
rolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its
termination inflicts a 'grievous loss' on the parolee . I... Id  at 482.
128. In the context of a parole revocation hearing, the court held that due process re-
quires at least: (a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the
parolee of evidence against him or her, (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present
witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses; (e) an impartial hearing board, and (f) a written statement by the fact finders of
the evidence relied on and the reasons for the conclusions reached. Id. at 487-89.
129. In both In re Gault and Morrissey, the private interest involved was the interest in
avoiding confinement. Similarly, an alien who is deprived of his or her right to live in the
United States, often suffers great personal hardship and/or imprisonment or other punish-
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and family. With such an important interest at stake, a returning resi-
dent alien should be given notice of all the charges raised in order to
allow him or her to prepare an effective defense.
The Immigration and Nationality Act, however, does not require
the immigration judge to inform the alien of the charges being
raised. 130 In fact, the immigration judge is not limited to consideration
of the charges raised by the government and may exclude the alien on
any ground listed in the Act.' 3 ' Thus, the Act does not require notice
to the returning resident alien of what he or she can expect to encounter
at the hearing. Without notice of all the charges, the alien cannot pre-
pare an effective defense. Therefore, to be consistent with the require-
ments of due process, an immigration judge in an exclusion hearing for
a returning resident alien should be limited to the charges raised by the
government as grounds for exclusion.
Burden of Proof
Section 291 of the Immigration and Nationality Act states that the
alien has the burden of proof in an exclusion hearing. 132 This provi-
sion, however, has been judicially modified as applied to returning resi-
dent aliens. In Kwong Hai Chew v. Rogers, 33 the Court held that if a
returning resident alien is to be deprived of his or her resident status,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service must be the moving party
and bear the burden of proof. 134 The INS, as a matter of practice, has
observed this requirement. 135 Therefore, no change in this procedure is
mandated by Landon v. Plasencia.
Section 291 also states that the degree of proof that must be shown
is proof that "establishes to the satisfaction of the Attorney General
ment when returned to the country from which he or she came, particularly if the alien is a
political refugee.
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1976).
131. In re Salazar, 17 I. & N. Dec. 167, 169 (B.I.A. 1979).
132. 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (Supp. V 1981).
133. 257 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
134. Id. In Beard v. Stahr, 370 U.S. 41 (1962), Justice Douglas cited Kwong Hai Chew v.
Rogers as an example of requiring the government to carry the burden of proof. The case
dealt with the general discharge of a military officer. Justice Douglas noted that "[iln com-
parable situations the government has been required to carry the burden of proof." Id. at 43
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
135. In re Bercerra-Miranda 12 1. & N. Dec. 358 (B.I.A. 1979). However, there is no
mention of a shift in the burden of proof in the regulations. Cf. Hoonsilapa v. INS, 575 F.2d
735, 737 (9th Cir. 1978) ("In a deportation proceeding the initial burden of showing lawful
entry into the United States is on the subject of deportation proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1361.
Once that burden has been satisfied, the INS must establish a prima facie case of alienage
and deportability. Trias-Hernandez v. INS, 528 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1975); Berahmand v.
INS, 549 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1977). When the INS sustains this burden, a presumption of
deportability exists that the subject must rebut.").
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that [the alien] is not subject to exclusion under any provision of [the
Act]."' 136 However, since section 291 has been held not to apply to re-
turning resident aliens as to the burden of proof,137 its provision re-
garding degree of proof probably does not apply.
Instead, it is suggested that the degree of proof required in a re-
turning resident alien's hearing be the same as that required in a depor-
tation hearing. In Woodby v. INS,138 the Supreme Court held that the
degree of proof required to deport a resident alien was "clear, unequiv-
ocal and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for de-
portation are true."'139 The Court reasoned that a higher standard of
proof should apply because of the drastic deprivation that may follow
when a resident alien is forced to leave the country. 14° Because a re-
turning resident alien faces the same possibility of drastic conse-
quences, a higher standard of proof should also apply in addressing the
"entry" question in an exclusion hearing. The government, which
bears the burden, should be required to prove that the alien has inter-
rupted his or her resident status and is excludable by "clear, unequivo-
cal and convincing" evidence. 41
Confrontation and Cross-Examination
The opportunity to confront the evidence produced by the govern-
ment and to cross-examine adverse witnesses is a due process protec-
tion that should be afforded a returning resident alien in an exclusion
136. 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976).
137. Kwong Hai Chew v. Rogers, 257 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See supra notes 133-34
& accompanying text.
138. 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
139. Id. at 286.
140. The petitioners in Woodby urged that the appropriate burden of proof in deporta-
tion proceedings should be that which the law imposes in criminal cases: the duty of prov-
ing the essential facts beyond a reasonable doubt. The Government, on the other hand,
pointed out that a deportation proceeding is not a criminal case, and that the appropriate
burden of proof should consequently be the one generally imposed in civil cases and admin-
istrative proceedings: the duty of prevailing by a mere preponderance of the evidence. The
Court stated: "To be sure, a deportation proceeding is not a criminal prosecution. But it
does not syllogistically follow that a person may be banished from this country upon no
higher degree of proof than applies in a negligence case. The Court has not closed its eyes to
the drastic deprivations that may follow when a resident of this country is compelled by our
Government to forsake all the bonds formed here and go to a foreign land where he often
has no contemporary identification." Id. at 285.
141. "The Government, admittedly, bears a heavy burden of proof in a deportation
case: its case must be established by 'clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence,' a test
approaching that in a criminal case of proof 'beyond a reasonable doubt."' Mason v. INS,
394 F.2d 223, 226 (2d Cir. 1968). See also United States ex rel. Leong v. O'Rourke, 125 F.
Supp. 769, 770 (W.D. Mo. 1954). See generally United States ex rel. Rongetta v. Neely, 207
F.2d 281, 284 (7th Cir. 1953); United States ex rel. Barilla v. Uhl, 27 F. Supp. 746, 747
(S.D.N.Y. 1939), aj'd, 108 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1940).
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proceeding. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 142 the Supreme Court stated that
"f[in almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions
of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-ex-
amine adverse witnesses."1 43 The right to cross-examination is a due
process requirement in administrative hearings involving denial of wel-
fare benefits, 144 revocation of parole, 145 and juvenile detention. 146 The
Supreme Court has held that the right to confrontation and cross-ex-
amination is almost "immutable in our jurisprudence."' 147 The Court
has been zealous in protecting these rights from erosion not only in
criminal cases, but also in all types of cases where administrative ac-
tions are under scrutiny.148
No provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act provides an
alien the opportunity to confront evidence or confront and cross-ex-
amine witnesses in an exclusion proceeding. 149 However, this right is
afforded the resident alien in a deportation proceeding.' 50 Under sec-
tion 242(b)(3), an alien in a deportation proceeding "shall have a rea-
sonable opportunity to examine the evidence against him, to present
evidence in his own behalf and to cross-examine witnesses presented by
142. 397 U.S. 254 (1969). See supra note I11.
143. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 269. See, e.g., Willner v. Comm. on Character &
Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1963); Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville & N.R. Co.,
227 U.S. 88, 93-94 (1913).
144. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 270.
145. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487 (1971) ("On request of the parolee, a person
who has given adverse information on which parole revocation is to be based is to be made
available for questioning in his presence.") The right to cross-examination may be over-
come by the interest of the informant in avoiding adverse consequences stemming from
providing information. Id. at 491 (Brennan, J., concurring).
146. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1966) ("[A]bsent a valid confession, a determination
of delinquency and an order of commitment to a state institution cannot be sustained in the
absence of sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination in accord-
ance with our law and constitutional requirements.").
147. Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959) ("Certain principles have remained
relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action
seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact find-
ings, the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual
so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the case of
documentary evidence, it is even more important where the evidence consists of the testi-
mony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or
persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. We have
formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination.
They have ancient roots. They find expression in the Sixth Amendment.. . . This Court has
been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal
cases ...but also in all types of cases where administrative ...actions were under
scrutiny.").
148. Id.
149. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1976).
150. Id. § 1252(b)(3).
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the Government." 1 51 Because the right to confrontation and cross-ex-
amination have been held to be due process requirements in most ad-
ministrative settings, it is likely that these protections are also
procedural rights of returning resident aliens in exclusion hearings.
152
Immigration judges in exclusion hearings should afford the returning
resident alien the opportunity to show that the charges brought against
him or her are untrue. The requirements of section 242(b)(3) should be
applied to the returning resident alien's exclusion hearing.
Self-Incrimination
The privilege against self-incrimination should be granted the re-
turning resident alien in an exclusion hearing. In Zn re Gault, the
Supreme Court stated that "Itihe privilege against self-incrimination
can be claimed in any proceeding, be it criminal or civil, administrative
or judicial, investigatory or adjudicative. It protects any disclosures
which the person may reasonably believe could be used in a criminal
prosecution or which 'could lead to other evidence that might be so
used.' 153 This privilege has been specifically applied to resident
aliens in deportation hearings. 54 However, no case or statute expressly
protects returning resident aliens in exclusion proceedings. 55 Because
an exclusion hearing is a civil administrative proceeding, it seems likely
that the privilege against self-incrimination applies. Therefore, it is
suggested that this privilege be afforded returning resident aliens in ex-
clusion hearings.
151. Id.
152. But see United States ex rel. Lee Kum Hoy v. Shaughnessy, 115 F. Supp. 302
(S.D.N.Y. 1953) (where blood grouping tests were relied upon to exclude an alien, there was
no denial of due process in allowing the introduction of the tables relating to such tests
without producing authors or tables for cross-examination).
153. 387 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1966) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 94
(1964) (White, J., concurring)).
154. Valeros v. INS, 387 F.2d 921, 922 (7th Cir. 1967). However, in a deportation hear-
ing, an alien may, unlike the criminal defendant, be required to answer nonincriminatory
questions about his or her alien status. Laqui v. INS, 422 F.2d 807, 809-10 (7th Cir. 1967).
If the matter is not incriminatory, the alien's silence may be used as the basis for drawing
adverse inferences. As Justice Brandeis stated in United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod,
263 U.S. 149 (1923): "Silence is often evidence of the most persuasive character ....
T]here is no rule of law which prohibits officers charged with the administration of the
immigration law from drawing an inference from the silence of one who is called upon to
speak.. . . A person arrested on the preliminary warrant is not protected by a presumption
of citizenship comparable to the presumption of innocence in a criminal case. There is no
provision which forbids drawing an adverse inference from the fact of standing mute." Id. at
153-54. See also Chavez-Raya v. INS, 519 F.2d 397, 401 (7th Cir. 1975).
155. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1976).
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Impartial Presiding Official
An immigration judge in an exclusion hearing has a powerful role.
He or she is authorized to conduct proceedings, administer oaths, pres-
ent and receive evidence, and interrogate, examine, and cross-examine
the alien or witnesses. 56 While the immigration judge must rest his or
her decision on the evidence produced at trial,157 he or she has the ex-
clusive power to determine the credibility of witnesses. 158 An immigra-
tion judge may not preside if he or she has participated in prosecuting
functions or in investigative work prior to the hearing.' 5 9
The dual role of an immigration judge as both interrogator and
decision-maker has been held to be fair and proper. 60 However, it
may be criticized as a role too active to allow the judge to be an impar-
tial decision-maker. In Morrisey v. Brewer, the Supreme Court held
that though a presiding official need not be a judicial officer, 16 he or
she must be an independent decision-maker. 62 Under current immi-
gration laws, it can be argued that the immigration judge is allowed to
become too involved in the examination process to make an impartial
decision. Thus, though the Plasencia decision does not require a
change in the role of the presiding official, its liberalizing effect should
spur a re-evaluation of the role of the presiding official.
Right to Counsel
The assistance of counsel in an exclusion hearing may have a
profound effect on the outcome of the hearing. In view of the complex-
ity of current immigration laws and procedures, an alien's ability to
present an effective defense may be thwarted in the absence of effective
representation. Thus, it is crucial that an alien be represented if he or
she desires.
There is no constitutional right to representation in an immigra-
tion hearing.163 However, Congress has legislated such a right into the
156. Id. § 1226(a).
157. Id. ("The determination of such special inquiry officer shall be based only on the
evidence produced at the inquiry."). A record must be made of the decision and the entire
hearing. Id.
158. Woon Sun Seung v. Proctor, 99 F.2d 285, 286 (9th Cir. 1938).
159. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1976) ("No special inquiry officer shall conduct a proceeding in
any case under this section in which he shall have participated in investigative functions or
in which he shall have participated (except as provided in this subsection) in prosecuting
functions.").
160. Le Tourneur v. INS, 538 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1976). See also Hosseinmardi v.
INS, 405 F.2d 25, 27-29 (9th Cir. 1968).
161. 408 U.S. 471, 486 (1971).
162. Id. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1969).
163. Martin-Mendoza v. INS, 499 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1974); Murgia-Melendrez v. INS,
407 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1969). But see Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1895)
("[Ilt must be concluded that all persons within the territory of the United States are entitled
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Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 292 provides that an alien
may be represented by counsel in an exclusion or a deportation hear-
ing.164 The denial of this right, absent a valid waiver, is reversible error
which cannot be cured by the application of any "harmless error"
test.' 65 Thus, an immigration judge should make sure that the alien
knows of the right to counsel and, if the alien decides to be represented
by counsel, that the hearing does not proceed without counsel.' 66
An alien may, however, waive the right to counsel.1 67 In Ramirez
v. INS, 68 the court noted that "[iut is well established that an alien can
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel."' 169
Where the immigration judge informs the alien of the right to counsel
and of the nature of the proceedings and the alien decides to proceed
without counsel, a hearing without counsel is fair.170 However, if the
alien is not provided with an understanding of the complexity of his or
her dilemma and is not made aware of the cogent legal arguments
which can be raised, the waiver of counsel is not "competently and
understandingly made."' 71 Therefore, an immigration judge should
fully advise the alien of the right to counsel, making certain that the
alien comprehends the seriousness of the hearing. 72
to the protection guaranteed by [the fifth and sixth] amendments, and that even aliens shall
not be held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime. . . nor be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law.").
164. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1976).
165. Castaneda-Delgado v. INS, 525 F.2d 1295, 1302 (7th Cir. 1975).
166. In addition to notice of the privilege of counsel, the immigration judge must inform
the alien of the availability of free legal services. 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(a) (1982). This regulation
was not in effect when Plasencia was heard. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(a) (1975). An immigra-
tion judge may include notice of the right to counsel and of the availability of free legal
services in the original notice of the time and charges of the hearing. However, the judge
should also inform the alien at the time of the hearing to make certain that any waiver of
counsel is competently and knowingly made.
167. Barthold v. INS, 517 F.2d 689, 691 (5th Cir. 1975).
168. 550 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1977).
169. Id. at 565.
170. Id.
171. Partible v. INS, 600 F.2d 1094, 1096 (5th Cir. 1979).
172. In Barthold v. INS, 517 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1975), the court held that the following
colloquy constituted a valid waiver:
Q. You have the right to be represented by an attorney at this hearing, if you
want, or you can go ahead if you do not choose to be represented. Do you
want to represented by a lawyer?
A. Can the Government give me an attorney?
Q. No, the Government cannot provide an attorney for you in these cases be-
cause we are prohibited by law from doing so. It must be an attorney at your
own expense. However, if you do not have the money to afford an attorney, I
can adjourn the case and give you the opportunity to contact Legal Services to
see whether or not they will provide an attorney for you. Do-you have-you
say you do not have sufficient money to pay for an attorney?
A. No, Sir.
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Though a resident alien has the right to counsel, he or she is not
entitled to appointed counsel under current immigration law. 173 The
Immigration and Nationality Act provides that the alien's right to
counsel is "at no expense to the government." 174 Thus, though the re-
turning resident alien faces severe consequences in an exclusion hear-
ing, including the possibility of deprivation of liberty, 175 he or she may
be unrepresented. If an alien is unable to afford a lawyer and has diffi-
culty getting free legal service, his or her right to counsel may be mean-
ingless. Unfortunately, because of the almost exclusive congressional
control of immigration law, courts will be hesitant to rule in direct con-
tradiction to the counsel provision in the Act. Therefore, it is suggested
that Congress reassess the necessity of appointed counsel to a returning
resident alien in an exclusion hearing.
Appellate Review
There is no right to an appeal under the Constitution, but the
American legal system has traditionally provided some method of re-
view. 176 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act an alien may ap-
peal an exclusion decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA). 177 If the BIA upholds the immigration judge's decision, there is
no further judicial review. 178 Thus, a returning resident alien has no
direct access to the American courts for a determination of his or her
right to return. Yet, because there is no constitutional right to appeal,
and because there is already a statutory right to an administrative re-
view provided in the Act, it is unlikely that courts will rule against the
Q. Well, do you want the opportunity to call Legal Services to see if they will
provide you with an attorney?
A. I will continue without an attorney.
Q. Very well. If at any time during the course of the proceedings you feel that
you are unable to represent any more or that you think an attorney's answer
will be necessary, just let me know and I will adjourn the case to still give you
a chance to get one. You understand that you will have this continuing right
until the case is complete?
A. Yes.
Id. at 691.
173. Chlomos v. Department of Justice, 516 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1975).
174. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1976).
175. See Hastings Comment, supra note 9, at 415-16; see also Note, Due Process and
Deportation-Is There a Right to Assigned Counsel?, 8 U.C.D. L. REV. 289 (1975).
176. See, e.g., 4 AM. JUR. 2D Appeal and Error § 1 (1962 & Supp. 1982).
177. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b) (1976) ("From a decision of a special inquiry officer excluding
an alien, such alien may take a timely appeal to the Attorney General, and any such alien
shall be advised of his right to take such appeal.").
178. An alien may, however, bring an action in habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(1976). Habeas corpus applies, however, only in limited situations. See generally 17 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4262-4265
(1978).
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procedure outlined in the Act. In this area also, the only possible solu-
tion is a re-evaluation by Congress of the need for recourse through the
judicial system.
Extent of Due Process Protection
The Plasencia decision leaves unanswered the practical question of
what procedure is due after the entry question is decided in an exclu-
sion hearing. The Court did not address whether an immigration judge
must continue a returning resident alien's exclusion hearing as a depor-
tation procedure once it is determined that there has been no entry, or
whether the exclusion hearing must end and a deportation hearing be-
gin. It is also uncertain whether the returning resident alien's right to
due process continues in an exclusion hearing once the judge deter-
mines that an entry has been made. These practical questions will face
all immigration judges in exclusion proceedings for returning resident
aliens. Because there are no similar situations in other administrative
areas, the judges will have complete discretion. It is suggested, how-
ever, that judges should err on the side of providing more protection
for returning resident aliens. Thus, if an entry has not been made, the
exclusion hearing should end and a deportation proceeding should be
initiated. If an entry has been made, the exclusion hearing should con-
tinue to afford due process protection to the returning resident alien.
Recommendation
To provide due process in exclusion hearings, it will be necessary
to modify the exclusion procedures outlined in the Immigration and
Nationality Act. At present, the procedural rights of a returning resi-
dent alien are undefined. The alien has no way of determining what
protections he or she can expect, or when there has been a violation of
due process.
Because the Plasencia Court did not list the due process protec-
tions necessary in an exclusion hearing, there is a great need for Con-
gress to specify the required procedures. The legislative process is a
slow one, however, and a revision of the Immigration and Nationality
Act may take years. Thus, immigration judges and the lower courts
will be forced to grapple with the many procedural issues raised by the
Plasencia decision without specific legislative guidelines. With such
important interests at stake for the returning alien, it is critical that the
proper procedural safeguards be provided. Therefore, it is strongly
suggested that the guidelines detailed in this Comment be considered.
Notice of all the charges should be given to a returning resident far
enough in advance of the hearing to allow the alien to prepare an effec-
March 1983]
tive defense. 179 At the hearing, the rights to confrontation and cross-
examination and the privilege against self-incrimination should be ob-
served. 180 The burden of proof should rest on the government to show
that the alien is excludable by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing"
evidence. 18 In addition, the immigration judge should refrain from
participating as an interrogator, in order to preserve his or her role as
an impartial decision-maker. 8 2 Finally, where any question exists as
to the procedures due in a returning resident alien's exclusion hearing,
greater, rather than lesser, protection should be provided. Because the
alien's interests involved are so important, every effort should be made
to provide a fair and adequate hearing.
Immigration judges and the lower courts should consider, in deter-
mining exclusion procedures, that the Act already provides a hearing
for aliens at the border. 183 Thus, enhancing the procedures detailed in
the Act to incorporate due process will not be overly burdensome on
the government. In contrast, the potential loss to the returning resident
alien is great. He or she stands to lose the same privilege as a resident
alien in a deportation hearing, the privilege of living in the United
States. With such an important interest involved, the procedure af-
forded the returning resident alien in an exclusion hearing should par-
allel that afforded a resident alien in a deportation hearing. At a
minimum, however, the exclusion hearing should provide the alien the
opportunity to effectively defend his or her right to return to the United
States.
Conclusion
The decision in Landon v. Plasencia in effect created an undefined
area of immigration procedure: exclusion with due process. Because
exclusion procedures in the Immigration and Nationality Act do not
incorporate due process and because the Piasencia Court did not ad-
dress the issue, the standards of due process in exclusion hearings will
necessarily develop in a case-by-case manner. Immigration judges in
exclusion proceedings will be required to provide due process to re-
turning resident aliens without clear guidelines as to what specific pro-
cedures are "due." Returning resident aliens will be unable to know
their constitutional rights or to determine when due process has been
violated. They will remain subject to the discretion of immigration
judges in providing procedural protections unless and until Congress
179. See supra notes 113-31 & accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 142-55 & accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 132-41 & accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 156-62 & accompanying text.
183. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1976).
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specifies what procedures are to be required in a returning resident
alien's exclusion hearing.
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